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The importance of social embeddedness in economic activity is now widely accepted. 
Embeddedness has been shown to be particularly significant in explaining the trajectory of 
regional development. Nonetheless, most studies of embeddeddness and its impacts have 
treated each locale as an independent unit. Following recent calls for the study of cross-
cluster social interactions, we look at the consistent failure of numerous localities in the 
United States with high potential to emulate Silicon Valley and achieve sustained success 
in the ICT industry. The paper contends that the answer lies in high-technology clusters 
being part of a larger system. Therefore, we must include in our analysis of their social 
structure the influence of cross-cluster embeddedness of firms and entrepreneurs. These 
cross-clusters dynamics lead to self-reinforcing social fragmentation in the aspiring 
clusters and, in time, to the creation of an industrial system in the United States based on 
stable dominant and subordinate (feeder) clusters. The paper expands theories of 
industrial clusters, focusing on social capital, networks, and embeddedness arguments, to 
explain a world with one predominant cluster region. It utilizes a multimethod analysis of 
the ICT industry centered in Atlanta, Georgia, as an empirical example to elaborate and 
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In the past forty years we have come to recognize the importance of embeddedness in economic 
activity. Under conditions of economic embeddedness, “the behavior and institutions to be 
analyzed are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a 
grievous misunderstanding” (Granovetter 1985) and actors do not behave atomistically but, 
rather, are embedded in “concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (Granovetter 1985). 
Embeddedness can refer to relationships between and across individuals, firms, industries, 
nonprofit organizations, and governments. Its impact has been shown to affect all aspects of 
economic behavior, from pricing and evaluating mergers and acquisitions to influencing the 
commercial and artistic quality of Broadway musicals to upgrading the quality of regional wines 
and transforming the economic fortunes of laggard communities (Haunschild 1993; Uzzi and 
Spiro 2005; McDermott, Corredoira et al. 2007; Safford 2009). Embedded ties can provide 
information benefits, allow the co-optation of sources of market constraints, provide access to 
critical resources, endow legitimacy and status, and shape identities (Krippner and Alvarez 
2007).  
 
One of the most consistent findings is that companies embedded within regions with favorable 
characteristics have a regional advantage over companies that are not (Piore and Sabel 1984; 
Porter 1990; Sabel 1992; Herrigel 1993; Saxenian 1994; Storper 1997; Uzzi 1999; Casper 2007). 
Furthermore, local embeddedness has been shown to make the difference between regional 
economic success and a slow decline in times of both crisis and growth (McDermott 2007; 
McDermott, Corredoira et al. 2007; Safford 2009). Indeed, the growing understanding of the 
value of local embeddedness is one of the reasons that the creation and promotion of regional clusters of innovation has become the beacon of hope for policy makers and academics who seek 
local economic growth.   
 
Nonetheless, embeddedness is not only local. All individuals and firms are part of various social 
networks that embed them in specific economic communities, some, or even most, of which 
might not be local. It is, therefore, crucial that we fully understand the impacts of cross-cluster 
embeddedness on local economic growth. Unfortunately, there is a significant gap in the 
literature on these issues  and there also are gaps in the literature regarding distant tie formation. 
While homophily, reciprocity, and repeated ties have been well studied in observation, most 
interorganizational networks maintain a balance between relations that bind similar entities and 
those that connect dissimilar entities. Our research is part of a current attempt to eliminate these 
shortcomings by facilitating understanding of the emergence of ties between spatially, 
relationally, and socio-demographically distant actors (Brass, Galaskiewicz et al. 2004; Sorenson 
and Stuart 2008). 
 
In the past few decades, numerous regions have boldly announced their intention to become “the 
next Silicon Valley” (Bresnahan and Gambardella 2004; O'Mara 2004; Breznitz 2007; Lerner 
2009). Carefully following the advice of many a scholar and consultant, local policy makers have 
taken measures to ensure that their regions are fully endowed with all the factors that have been 
pointed out as the necessary ingredients of a successful technology cluster, from a high-quality 
powerful research university, to specialized venture funding (Bresnahan, Gambardella et al. 
2001; Cooke 2002; O'Mara 2004; Braunerhjelm and Feldman 2006; Whittington, Owen-Smith et 
al. 2009). Many of these local leaders have also accompanied these investments with flexible policies that include mentorship, entrepreneurial education, tax breaks and other business 
incentives, and dedicated incubation spaces. However, despite these efforts, very few globally 
successful high-technology clusters have emerged in the United States in the past four decades 
(Stuart and Sorenson 2003; Casper 2007; Lerner 2009). 
 
Most academics and policy makers believe this sobering result is due to an apparent inability to 
completely decipher the “genetic code” of Silicon Valley.  
 
We disagree. The true theoretical puzzle is not deciphering Silicon Valley but the exact opposite: 
explaining the almost universal failure of the best efforts led by the finest minds to achieve much 
sustained success anywhere else in the United States. Consequently, we argue that if we are to 
advance theory and improve policy, we must explain why such efforts have failed. 
 
We contend that the answer lies in the fact that clusters do not develop in isolation. Attempts to 
develop them are locale-specific and each cluster is analyzed as an independent unit, however, 
they are all part of a national and international industrial system. Once we add cross-cluster 
interactions to our analysis, the influence of cross-cluster social embeddedness of firms and 
entrepreneurs becomes apparent. One of the most consistent findings of economic sociology and 
economic geography has been that in order to be successful in new high-technology industries, 
companies and individuals need to be embedded in a vibrant industrial community (Piore and 
Sabel 1984; Porter 1990; Sabel 1992; Herrigel 1993; Saxenian 1994; Storper 1997; Almeida and 
Kogut 1999; Castilla 2003; Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Casper 2007; McDermott 2007; 
Whittington, Owen-Smith et al. 2009). Embedded economic actors are affected more by their relations with other actors than by abstract norms or concepts of self-interest. “A range of firm 
behaviors—strategies, structures, and performance—could be affected by the firm’s relations 
with other firms” (Mizruchi 1996). However, being embedded in an industrial community does 
not necessarily mean being physically located in the same locale throughout the whole company 
life-cycle. In fact, statistically it is easier for start-ups funded outside Silicon Valley to achieve 
commercial success (Powell, White et al. 2005; Whittington, Owen-Smith et al. 2009). 
 
However, to be successful, firms located in aspiring clusters need to weave themselves into the 
industrial communities of the more established clusters, such as those in Silicon Valley or 
Boston. We argue that this long-distance embeddedness has a significant negative impact on the 
development of a coherent industrial community in the aspiring cluster. With their limited social 
resources focused on what they view as a critical long-distance relationship with financiers, 
customers, peers, and key individuals in the dominant clusters, the amount of time and effort 
management invests in the local community is greatly reduced. In addition, as they become more 
embedded in the dominant cluster, promising firms will tend to relocate there. The result is social 
fragmentation of the industry in the aspiring regions.  
 
Furthermore, this social fragmentation is self-reinforcing. Operating in an environment where 
companies lack a strong local community and already have at their disposal role models for 
success and institutionalized patterns enabling them to become embedded in the dominant 
cluster, promising new start-ups will, from their inception, look outside the cluster for their 
socio-business interactions. The result is a continuous replication and deepening of local social 
fragmentation. The end result of this process, we argue, is a national system of a small number of dominant clusters served by a large number of subordinate feeder clusters. These feeder clusters 
end up specializing in creating new companies whose full economic benefits are enjoyed by the 
dominant clusters.  
 
Hence, while the majority of the current theories view the growth of clusters as an independent 
local social evolution, we view cluster development as part of the evolution of a national and 
international industrial system. For example, Sean Safford has shown how the internal history of 
the very different social network structures of the civil and economic leadership in Allentown, 
Pennsylvania, and Youngstown, Ohio, explains the divergence in their fates after the collapse of 
their steel industries (Safford 2009). In a different vein, Steve Casper explains the development 
of a new successful biotechnology cluster in San Diego by analyzing the rapid growth of 
cohesive social networks within the industry (Casper 2007). Very few theories account for the 
failure of networks, let alone the failure of cohesive networks to form where expected (Schrank 
and Whitford 2009). We argue that while local social interaction is of the utmost importance, the 
common outcome—that is, the inability of many aspiring clusters to coalesce as a cohesive 
social unit—is better explained by looking at cross-cluster interactions. By doing so, we can 
easily explain why, once a few dominant technology clusters have already established 
themselves in the United States, most aspiring clusters would be expected to suffer from a local 
technology industry that is continuously and severely socially fragmented.  
 
To develop and substantiate our argument, the next section of the paper elaborates on the 
theories of industrial clusters with specific focus on social capital, networks, and embeddedness 
arguments. We then develop the logic of these arguments to fit a world with an exceedingly dominant cluster and develop the predictions these models would lead us to expect. In the third 
section we offer an extensive analysis of the history of Atlanta, Georgia, ICT industry as an 
empirical example to more fully flesh out our arguments and further inductively develop our 
theory (Eckstein 1975; Eisenhardt 1989; Ragin and Becker 1992; Gerring 2004; Alexander and 
Bennett 2005). This analysis is conducted using multiple research methods, including several 
social networking techniques, archival research, interviews, and statistical data analysis.   
 
Theory 
Economic embeddedness creates economic value through three mechanisms: trust, fine-grained 
information transfer, and joint problem solving (Uzzi 1999; Polanyi 2001; Seshadri and Shapira 
2003). Through these three mechanisms, embeddedness reduces incentives to engage in 
opportunism and malfeasance (Granovetter 1985; Putnam 2001). The existence within a cluster 
of these vibrant social networks and high mobility enables firms to react to market developments 
more rapidly than their competitors. Embedded networks lead to improved information flows 
and better collective learning and collective action. Competitive advantage requires continual 
learning and innovation (Asheim and Coenen 2006), and the collective learning that takes place 
within thriving clusters provides a substantial advantage, because innovation is territorially 
embedded, and interorganizational networks facilitate collective learning (Lundvall 1992; 
Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1997; Lawson and Lorenz 1999; Audia, Sorenson et al. 2001). 
Collective action is also linked to particular social institutions and to the development of unique 
cluster identity that informs investment decisions and cluster development (Romanelli and 
Khessina 2005; Braunerhjelm and Feldman 2006).  
 We contend that the reason so many aspiring technology clusters never achieve their promise is a 
continuous fragmentation of the locale’s industrial social structure. This continuous 
fragmentation is the outcome of actions taken by local entrepreneurs and firms who aim to 
maximize their commercial success within a national industrial environment with already 
established dominant clusters. The impulse to locate operations where economic gain would be 
maximized is offset by social factors. Nonetheless, as companies are founded in one locale they 
quickly become embedded in the dominant region. As they seek out valuable connections, they 
find that proportionately more potential valuable connections are outside their own region, and as 
they make these valuable connections, they become more and more embedded in the dominant 
region (Dahl and Sorenson 2010). In order to become successful, technology companies located 
outside the dominant cluster must create ties outside their region, particularly within the 
dominant cluster region (Whittington et al. 2009). As a result, over time, companies—in part 
intentionally and in part by chance—become more embedded in the dominant cluster region and 
less embedded in their own. Just as Dahl and Sorenson note that social ties can cause individuals 
to be attached to locations where they have lived, social ties can also cause them to move away 
from these locations. Entrepreneurs find it difficult to access the information and resources they 
require when they reside far from the sources of these valuable inputs (Sorenson 2003). 
Eventually, social agents will reach a tipping point, where the value of their distant ties 
outweighs the value of their geographically similar ties, and the entity will make the rational 
decision to move. This dynamic is self-reinforcing, as the best and brightest (seeking to 
maximize their chances of success) continue to tie themselves to the more successful cluster, 
partly to compensate for the fragmented social structure of their locale. However, in so doing 
they perpetuate, and perhaps aggravate, the situation in their own region.      
Studies of different regional technology and venture capital industries have shown these 
regions to have varying amounts of success. One study showed Silicon Valley’s relative success 
over Boston in the venture capital industry. Silicon Valley exhibited more collaboration among 
VC firms, a larger number of investments and amount of money that stayed local, and a different 
structure of industry ties. Seventy percent of VCs in Silicon Valley were connected to other VCs, 
compared to only fifty-four percent in Boston. Also, Silicon Valley VCs had 2.81 ties on 
average, while Boston VCs had only 1.53 (Castilla 2003). A historical study of the 
biotechnology industry in San Diego showed that the management team of an early San Diego 
company initiated links through labor mobility that have continued to the present, allowing San 
Diego to exhibit a great degree of embeddedness. From data for management teams from 1978 to 
2005, it was shown that by 2005, ninety-five percent of the individuals were included in the main 
component, with an average path length of 4.2 for the 867 individuals (Casper 2007). A study of 
Boston’s dedicated biotechnology firms found that forty-three percent of those firms were in the 
main component in 1988, while seventy-two percent were in the main component in 1999. The 
study also showed benefits to innovation as a result of changes in local centrality (Owen-Smith 
and Powell 2004). 
 
The basic assumption of most researchers on clusters who analyze them as an independent unit is 
that over time, with the addition of more resources, individuals, firms, and organizations, the 
local structure will become denser and a true industrial community will emerge. We argue the 
opposite: It is specifically because clusters are part of a national and international system that, in 
view of the fact that few dominant clusters already exist, the actual dynamic will be the recreation of social fragmentation. Locally, this social fragmentation over time should lead the 
aspiring cluster to reach the limits of its growth. When reproduced at a national level, we expect 
that such a dynamic will lead to the rise of a few dominant clusters, for which many aspiring 
clusters serve as satellites or feeders.  
 
If our line of reasoning is correct, what we should expect to find in an aspiring cluster is that 
firms and entrepreneurs actively seek to embed themselves in the dominant cluster. They would 
do so through several mechanisms, aligning themselves with the status-granting organizations 
and individuals of the dominant cluster, where they serve as investors, board members, key 
customers, or strategic collaborators (Klepper 2001; Sorenson 2003; Klepper and Sleeper 2005).  
 
Even without any active attempt at becoming embedded in the dominant cluster, a company 
located outside it may quickly find it is acquiring ties within the dominant cluster. Since some of 
these early connections extract major influence on the company’s development more often than 
not these early ties quickly structure the company’s networks (Castilla 2003). Furthermore, in the 
last two decades more and more VC firms have started to look outside their immediate 
surrounding for investment opportunities (Sorenson and Stuart 2008). However, once they locate 
such an opportunity many times they actively encourage their newly invested company to locate 
geographically propinquus to their headquarters (Fried and Hisrich 1994). 
 
Hence, in the case of information and communication technologies (ICT), in which clear 
dominant clusters have been established for several decades, our arguments would lead us to 
expect to find a particular pattern of continuing, or even worsening, social fragmentation in the aspiring clusters. Furthermore, we would expect to see this fragmentation occurring at all levels 
of the ICT industry in both small and large companies, even globally successful ones, and across 
all facets of meaningful social interaction, such as investors or critical customers.    
 
In addition, we expect to find similar patterns at the individual level, where the forces leading to 
cross-cluster embeddedness and local fragmentation might be stronger. The reason is that by 
operating or being embedded in a vibrant technology cluster-embedded region, individuals 
significantly decrease their career risk by creating numerous alternate employment options 
should a given startup fail or dismiss them. According to Casper, this dynamic leads already 
successful technology clusters to develop what Bahrami and Evans have termed “recycling 
mechanisms” to help preserve the value of human and physical assets previously committed to 
failed enterprises (Bahrami and Evans 1999; Casper 2009). This helps explain why within 
successful clusters leading scientists and managers would give up secure careers in established 
companies and university labs to work at highly risky, if potentially lucrative, startups. This is 
another reason that embedding in the networks of the dominant cluster becomes increasingly 
enticing to individuals who start firms in other locales. At its most extreme, it should lead to 
career patterns in which founding or managing a company in an aspiring cluster is a career 
advancement mechanism by which entrepreneurs tie themselves to the more dynamic labor 
markets of the dominant cluster.   
 
One of the best, and probably most rational, strategies to overcome the disadvantage of locating 
elsewhere is for companies and individuals to tie themselves to the dominant cluster. Following 
this strategy on a large scale, however, leads to systemic and chronic social fragmentation of the local ICT industrial community, which in turns leads local companies and individuals to tie 
themselves ever more closely to more established clusters. This is a self-reinforcing sequence 
that leads the aspiring region to a development trajectory of a feeder cluster.  
 
Thus, we argue that ICT cluster emergence in the United States in the past four decades has been 
extremely rare, not because other regions lack factors and resources that would encourage 
clusters’ emergence, but because of the national (sometimes international) socio-business 
dynamics of the industry.  
 
Research Methods and Data 
Atlanta, Georgia, offers particularly rich empirical ground for a theory framing exercise. The 
area is abundantly endowed with all the resources deemed necessary for cluster formation: (1) 
The metropolitan area has numerous renowned universities and is the fourth richest in research 
investment in the country in absolute dollar terms; (2) It is home to a large highly educated labor 
pool; (3) It has a wealth of new technologies and entrepreneurs; (4) Atlanta attracts the young 
“creative” class from across the United States, with a net inflow of 25- to 34-year-olds from 44 
of the 49 largest U.S. metropolitan areas; (5) In both absolute and per capita terms, the city is 
rich in venture capital (VC) financing; (6) It has a history of having several companies grow to 
global prominence in the respective niches; (7) Atlanta has the country’s fifth-largest 
concentration of Fortune 500 companies, after only New York, Houston, Dallas, and Chicago, 
and it has consistently been in the top five since 1996. This high concentration of Fortune 500 
companies ensures a strong local sophisticated demand for technology and can anchor their ICT 
suppliers in the area by serving as a leading customer; and (8) local policymakers are known for their sustained efforts at cluster development, which includes specialized programs to attract star 
scientists and amply fund them, dedicated incubators, multiple mentorship and entrepreneurial 
education programs, and well-established public-private technology associations (Taylor 2008).  
 
Atlanta has played a prominent role as a case study in the development of modern social 
networks, power, and structure, so it is appropriate to use it as an example in social structure 
arguments about the concentration of economic power in the United States (Hunter 1953).  
 
However, despite these strong positive characteristics, Atlanta’s technology industry growth is, 
at best, stagnant, as can be seen in Figure 1. As Figure 2 illustrates,  more than 40 percent of the 
new technology companies that achieved commercial success and secured institutional VC 
investment left Atlanta within a few years of being founded. In addition, Atlanta had only had 
five technology IPOs from 2001 to 2011, and none since 2005.  
<<Insert Figure 1 and 2 about Here>> 
 
We use a confluence of research methods within a single-case study to flesh out the dynamics of 
our theory, elaborate on the mechanisms, and present a real case to support our theory. To 
analyze the evolution of Atlanta’s ICT industry and its rise and stagnation over time, we used 
multiple data sources to determine the composition of Atlanta’s technology industry, build a 
dynamic history of its development path, success, limitation, company growth patterns, and its 
social structure. First, aggregate data of the technology industry in Georgia were gathered. The 
Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) Million Dollar Database and Southeast Innovations data have been 
merged to create a list containing most of the technology companies in Georgia(D&B). The Southeast Innovations database was compiled by Innovations Publishing as a list of “privately 
owned investment-worthy companies” located in the Southeast (Innovations Publishing LLC). 
Because the D&B Million Dollar database includes mostly large companies and the Southeast 
Innovations database includes mostly small, new companies, we obtained a fuller picture of the 
current state of the industry in Atlanta by merging the two. The combined dataset includes 431 
companies from Southeast Innovations, 412 companies from D&B, and 12 companies that 
appeared in both. Additional aggregate data were obtained from the County Business Patterns 
from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau).  
 
We  complement our analysis with a few narrow samples, which allow us to focus on specific 
mechanisms in cases that might have a high number of total relationships due to the success or 
promise of the company or industry. We created two different samples of the overall ICT 
industry and one niche-specific sample. The two overall samples were constructed using the 
Atlanta Business Chronicle annual publication of a “Book of Lists” (Atlanta Business Chronicle 
1998-2008). For the first list, we used the top 25 VC-raising companies by quarter, which 
provides for each company the dollar amount of investment (summed across all investments in a 
given company in a given quarter), nature of business, city where the company operates, and 
names of investors for each company/quarter listed. We cleaned the aggregate sample, so it 
would contain only technology-development ICT companies, analyzing the complete nine years 
available (1999 through 2007) and added investors’ cities and states, the number of companies 
and deals (listed) for each investor, the current companies’ status and location (acquired, moved, 
still in Georgia, or no longer in business; as well as their current physical location and, if 
acquired, what company acquired them), the total amount raised by each company (includes only quarters when the company was in the top 25), number of investors in each company, number of 
Georgia-based investors for each company, years in which each company made the top 25, and 
NAICS and SIC codes for the companies.  
 
The second list was compiled using the Atlanta Business Chronicle’s “Tech 50” list, which 
enumerates the 50 best technology companies of the year in Atlanta. For each company, this list 
includes the rank, name, web site, and year established, as well as whether the company is public 
or private, for 1998 through 2002, 2005, and 2008 (Deloitte & Touche and Arthur Andersen 
originally compiled these data).  
 
Lastly we conducted a more focused analysis of the health information technology and 
emergency medical records sub-sector (HIT). This sub-sector was chosen not only because it has 
been targeted by the state of Georgia as the next promising and emerging industry to arise within 
the Atlanta region but also because it was recognized as the most likely technology sub-industry 
to consider Atlanta one of its most dominant locales worldwide. Indeed, the industry’s leading 
international organization and action group—the Healthcare Information and Management 
Systems Society (HIMSS)—has its origins in Atlanta. Furthermore, the Georgia Institute of 
Technology, Atlanta’s premier engineering school, has invested heavily in the development of 
the field for the past three decades and was helped in the recruitment of star scientists by the 
Georgia Research Alliance. We defined the industry using the list of 103 companies identified by 
the Enterprise Innovation Institute HIT initiative.  
 We developed two kinds of social networks to ensure robustness as well as to check different 
mechanisms through which cross-cluster embeddedness leads to local social fragmentation: 
career affiliation and interlock networks. A career affiliation network is one in which ties 
between members in that network (here limited to executive team members) are created when 
two or more members are jointly employed in the same technology company at the same time 
(Uzzi and Spiro 2005). This type of network is particularly useful and essential in the technology 
industry, in which job mobility is considered a particularly important factor in a location’s 
success as a cluster in the industry (Saxenian 1994; Fallick, Fleischman et al. 2006; Casper 
2007).  
 
To construct the career affiliation networks, we consulted companies’ web sites, news articles, 
and the Internet Archive to determine the names and positions of the management team and 
members of the board of all the companies in 2000 and 2008. Career histories were compiled for 
these individuals as far back as could be found (1980 in some cases) until the present. The career 
history data were gathered from SEC filings, web searches, and LinkedIn. Where possible, data 
were cross-checked to ensure accuracy. Dyadic ties between executives are created through joint 
employment at the same company at the same time. In this way, ties can be created between 
companies only when job mobility occurs. When executives change jobs, they maintain ties with 
their previous company while gaining ties with their new place of employment. For this analysis, 
an assumption of the five-year decay rule was made, as has been used in previous studies of a 
similar nature (Uzzi and Spiro 2005; Fleming and Frenken 2006; Casper 2007). The five-year 
decay rule assumes that ties linking an individual to a company cease to exist five years after that 
individual moves to another company, unless the tie is renewed by subsequent employment. In the case of the HIT companies, similar data were collected on the full management teams of all 
103 companies in the 2008 list. As the data from which to construct the complete sample of HIT 
firms in Atlanta circa 2000 were of significantly lower quality, we limited ourselves to 2008.   
 
Apart from career affiliation, board interlocks have been shown to be one of the most important 
types of connections companies have and a straightforward way to provide for 
interorganizational collaboration and the transfer of knowledge between firms (Mizruchi and 
Bunting 1981; Mizruchi 1996). For example, Davis (1996), in a path-breaking study on the 
networks of Fortune 500 companies, showed that the type of interlocks has a marked impact on 
company behavior and that the most useful outside directors are other CEOs. Haunschild and 
Beckman have shown the influence of interlocks as a significant source of information on many 
critical firms’ decisions, not least, mergers and acquisitions (Haunschild 1993; Haunschild and 
Beckman 1998; Beckman and Haunschild 2002). Marquis, in his influential work on social 
imprinting, has also demonstrated the usefulness of board interlock network analysis in historical 
tracing of local industrial dynamics (Marquis 2003). Similarly, McDermott pointed to the 
importance of firms’ ties to other firms in cases of regional industrial upgrading (McDermott, 
Corredoira et al. 2007).  
 
We used two software packages in our social network analysis—UCINET and Pajek, which are 
standard in social network analysis. For creating social network diagrams, Guess was also used. 
Within Guess, the Bin Pack and GEM algorithms were used to display the data. Finally, to better 
understand the dynamics of the industry and to be able to offer a richer conceptualization of the 
industry development and behavior, we conducted eighteen focused interviews with the founders of both public and private technology companies, heads of VC funds, state officials, and key 
academics. 
 
The Rise and Stagnation of the IT Industry in Atlanta 
As in Silicon Valley, Atlanta’s technology industry has its roots in defense contracts.  In 1941, 
Air Force Plant #6 was built in Marietta, an Atlanta suburb.  In 1946, the Georgia Institute of 
Technology (Georgia Tech) expanded its graduate programs, starting the transformation that 
would lead it to become one of the nation’s top four graduate engineering universities by the end 
of the twentieth century. In 1965, the formation of the Georgia Science and Technology 
Commission institutionalized innovation policy as one of the core pillars of economic 
development in Georgia.  
 
Atlanta’s first globally successful technological entrepreneurs were quick to follow. The two 
most celebrated companies—around which the ICT industry in metropolitan Atlanta was 
supposed to flourish and grow—were Scientific-Atlanta in hardware and MSA (Management 
Science America) in software. The two companies were formed in the 1950s and 1960s and 
continued to be key players at the national level in the technology industry through the 1990s and 
the 2000s.  
 
In a classic story of the creation of technology startups, Scientific-Atlanta (SA) began in 1951 as 
a tiny university spin-off in defense-sponsored radar-related research that quickly expanded to its 
main source of growth—satellite and cable communication—and grew to become a multi-
billion-dollar company. The company also became one of the main breeding grounds for new ventures, and CEO Glen Robinson became a leader of the local technology industry and an early 
promoter of policy initiatives, such as Georgia Tech’s incubator – the Advanced Technology 
Development Center (ATDC).  By 1999, SA had grown to 2,800 employees and $1.1 billion in 
sales. By 2005, SA, together with Motorola, was still the largest producer of set-top boxes for 
cable TV, employing 6,500 people in 70 countries with $1.9 billion in sales (Scientific-Atlanta 
2005; Scientific-Atlanta 2005).  However, in 2006 SA was acquired by California-based Cisco 
Systems for $6.9 billion and became the mainstay of Cisco’s Video Technology Group (Atlanta 
Business Chronicle 2008).  
MSA was founded in 1963, by five Georgia Tech graduates as a bespoke contract programming 
company. In 1971, MSA went bankrupt, and John P. Imlay became the CEO. Within a decade 
MSA became the largest software applications company in the world, listing publically on 
NASDAQ in 1981. However, MSA was unable to change its products and business model to fit 
with the ongoing transformation from mainframe to personal computing (PC) and in 1990 was 
acquired for $333 million (slightly above its annual revenues), by Dun & Bradstreet (Computer 
History Museum 2007; Atlanta Business Chronicle 2008). Nevertheless, the influence of MSA 
and John Imlay on the development of the technology industry in Atlanta has continued. Imlay 
Investment, run by MSA’s former CFO Sigmund Mosley, has been Atlanta’s premier seed and 
angel capital fund.  
 
In the 1980s, Atlanta-based companies were prominent worldwide in the data communications 
technology industry. Digital Communications Associates (DCA) controlled the PC-to-mainframe 
market with their its hardware called IRMA, which was one of the top five largestbest-selling 
products in the PC industry in the 1980s. SA controlled the set-top box market;; Hayes Microcomputer Products topped the modem market;; and Microstuf lead the modem software 
market with Crosstalk, a communications program that became the industry standard for modem 
modem-to to-computer communication. With this combination of companies, Atlanta was the 
leader in data communications companies for in both hardware and software. However, this 
dominance did not last long with: all All the above above-mentioned companies either going 
went bankrupt or being were acquired, without and noa new wave of local data communication 
companies to taketook their place; , eeven when at the a time when the data communication 
industry as a whole became one the fastest fastest-growing global ICT markets with because of 
the advent of the Internet (Reid 1986; Yates 2010).  
 
In conjunction with the early success stories of the technology industry, by the late 1970s 
Georgia Tech became known as the nexus of new technology initiatives, and the university’s role 
in Atlanta’s economic development became a focus for city leaders. This role was 
institutionalized by the end of the 1990s with the development of Technology Square—a site on 
the corner of Fifth and Spring streets, where the state’s development agencies, Georgia Tech 
Enterprise Innovation Institute, ATDC, and the Georgia Tech College of Management are 
located.  Policy initiatives to develop the local technology industry continued at an accelerated 
rate after the 1980s, when Atlanta developed the capacity to incubate start-ups through ATDC, 
local sources of VC, and a few established technology firms. In 1998, the Metro Atlanta 
Chamber of Commerce formally envisioned Atlanta’s future as a high-technology city by 
establishing the “Industries of the Mind,” a five-year campaign to recruit and create new 
technology firms (Combes 2002; Taylor 2008).  In 1990, a major milestone in securing a long-
term commitment to the creation and sustainment of a local “knowledge economy” was reached with the establishment of the Georgia Research Alliance.  
 
Atlanta enjoyed a successful early history in fostering leading international companies in both 
hardware and software. Nevertheless, even with these early successes and the growing number of 
policy initiatives, Atlanta’s technology industry has stagnated in the past decade, as seen in 
Figure 2.  
 
Even a brief analysis of the industry reveals the rapid decline of Atlanta’s large technology 
companies. As shown in Figure 1, very few large technology companies remain in Atlanta, the 
number is steadily decreasing, and even those that have had global success have been acquired 
by non-Georgia companies. The number of technology companies in Georgia in 2006 was less 
than half that in 2000. In interviews, industry leaders appeared to be acutely aware of the 
problems that this situation creates for continuous growth of the industry.  
 
This pattern of companies’ being acquired by out-of-state corporations is not the only source of 
attrition for Atlanta’s technology companies. Companies have also moved their operations out of 
Atlanta for other reasons. For example, Appcelerator, founded by Jeff Haynie and Nolan Wright 
in 2006, left only two years later.  
 
Although all players agreed that Appcelerator held a lot of promise—and the founders 
maintained close ties to the community—the firm was not funded by local money but by a Menlo 
Park (CA) VC. The reasons for this differ according to who is asked: local VCs took too long to 
put a deal on the table or did not have enough connections to offer, or cared far more about finance than ideas. In 2008 Appcelerator moved to Mountain View, California, because Haynie 
believed that by doing so he could take advantage of every option possible to help Appcelerator 
succeed. Moving there would offer an advantage because the area is “the heart of where things 
are happening today with a set of partners that have done it over and over again” (Haynie 2008).  
 
The decline and stagnation of Atlanta’s ICT industry is even more surprising as it coincided with 
the biggest increase in the availability of all the factors considered desirable and necessary for a 
technology industry to prosper. Atlanta has continued to expand as a locus of research, becoming 
the four-richest metropolitan area in terms of R&D dollars invested. Even in terms of VC 
financing, Atlanta compared favorably with all other emerging ICT clusters, such as Austin and 
the Research Triangle in North Carolina (PricewaterhouseCoopers ; Commerce 2006). The 
following analyzes the reasons for the flight of Atlanta’s ICT industry, despite its positive 
attributes.   
 
Results 
All our analyses point to the same result: Atlanta’s ICT industry is extremely socially 
fragmented. The number of local ties embedding companies in the area is significantly lower 
than one would normally expect from a random sample of similar companies in the same locale. 
This result is even more surprising because in Atlanta many of the companies’ founders 
graduated from the same school, Georgia Tech.   
 
Furthermore, as our theoretical framework predicts, promising companies tend to leave the 
cluster (due to either relocation or M&A) during their rapid growth stage. Finally, as suspected, over time the industry’s social fragmentation is worsening across all dimensions of companies’ 
social networks.  
 
We started by analyzing the social structure of the overall ICT industry network. As can be seen 
in Figure 3, few ties are created through interlocks, with most of the industry being isolates. 
Furthermore, the overall structure is extremely sparse and fragile. Most of the connections are 
singular, that is, the movement or death of one individual would break the component. 
Accordingly, our analysis revealed an industry suffering from extreme social fragmentation and 
a low level of local embeddedness. 
<<Figure 3 about here>> 
 
Even when we added the interlock network of the overall ICT network shown in Figure 4 to 
investors (with ties to companies in which they invested) and lawyers (with ties to companies to 
which they offer services), the network remained sparsely populated, with a low number of 
multiple connections and low density, as seen in Figure 4.  
<<Insert Figure 4 about here>> 
 
We then looked at our various sub-samples. Analysis of the board interlocks of both the most 
promising and most successful companies showed a similar illustration of local fragmentation. 
Even the addition to the sample of Fortune 500 companies did not change the network structure. 
Figure 5 shows the connectivity present through board member interlocks among and between 
the highly successful companies and Fortune 500 companies. Even in this sample of elite 
companies, it is rare for board members to sit concurrently on boards of multiple companies. Only five of the forty-six highly successful companies (11%) for which we acquired data have 
interlocks with Georgia-based Fortune 500 companies. Only seven of the forty-six (15%) have 
interlocks with other highly successful Georgian companies. 
 
Similarly, as seen in Figure 6, the same fragmentation is present in the board interlocks of the 
population of highly promising Atlanta companies. Even though we would expect to see a high 
number of board interlocks between these VC-invested companies, since venture capitalists are 
considered crucial local embedders, the same level of fragmentation was found. Only twenty-
eight of the seventy-three companies (38%) are connected at all. 
<<Figure 5 and 6 about here>> 
 
Nonetheless, board membership interlock analysis might not fully represent the most dynamic 
domains of cross-company social networks, so we added career affiliation networks to the 
analysis. Figure 7 shows the social network diagram of the career affiliation network of both the 
most promising and the most successful companies for the most recent year available, 2008, and 
clearly indicates a low level of connections between companies. The vast majority of companies 
shown are isolated. Of the sixty-one companies for which career histories of executives were 
available, only twenty-seven had connections to any other companies on the list. The majority of 
individuals are not connected to any individuals other than those with whom they worked in 
2008. This is an unusual result in networks of this type (Uzzi and Spiro 2005; Casper 2007; 
Casper 2009).  
<<Figure 7 about here>> 
 However, one alternative explanation for this finding is that the set of firms we are investigating 
is too diverse. Accordingly, we conducted the same analysis with respect to the HIT sub-sector, 
finding that the career affiliation social network in that industry is, if anything, even more 
fragmented. As seen in Figure 8, only 9.6% of the executive team members of Georgia’s HIT 
companies were included in the largest component of the network (20 of 208). Only twelve HIT 
companies in Atlanta are connected to any other HIT companies through career mobility ties.  
<<Figure 8 about here>> 
 
This social fragmentation was observed by many of our interviewees. For example, a venture 
capitalist who invests in Atlanta and other markets addressed this fragmentation in an interview: 
In general all of the relationships I’m setting up … none of them are with Atlanta-based 
companies. … I don’t see the law firms who are really reaching out … and the 
accountants are the same way. That whole ecosystem just seems to be missing, which I 
think in the Boston and California areas is critical for getting money; a lot of that 
infrastructure appears to be missing in Atlanta. 
 
What accounts for such severe fragmentation? To answer this question, we looked at the data to 
see whether any specific patterns emerged. Because investors, specifically VC investors from out 
of state, have been repeatedly called crucial in the literature as well as in our own interviews, we 
looked first at their role, focusing our analysis on the sample of highly promising companies. 
The list included specific records of 364 different investors, but many VCs are mentioned 
multiple times since they have been involved in several big deals. A total of 814 VC investment 
events are listed for the period 1999 to 2007. Of these, 157 represented deals with Georgia 
venture capital firms and 657 were with VC firms outside Georgia. Of the 144 companies 
receiving VC investment, only six received all their investment from Georgia-based sources. In 
order to determine whether funding for more promising companies came more often from VCs 
outside Georgia, we ordered the location of investment by the rank of the technology companies on the list, with nine companies at each rank. As seen in Figure 9, higher-ranked companies on 
list of top VC deals had a smaller number of investors from Georgia.  
<<Insert Figure 9 about here>> 
 
Georgia-based investors were active in 157 deals, California investors in 125, New York and 
New Jersey investors in 105, and Massachusetts investors in 101. These three regions, the two 
dominant ICT clusters and the main financial industry hub, were by far the largest investors in 
Georgia-based technology companies. The next-most-frequent investor state was Pennsylvania, 
with 32 deals. 
 
This behavior differs markedly from that in the dominant cluster. Silicon Valley companies 
famously do not seek VC that originates outside the Valley (Florida and Kenney 1990; Kenney 
2000). Yet technology companies in Georgia clearly act as if they should find at least one 
investor outside the state. Ninety-six percent of the highly promising companies had at least one 
out-of-state investor (138 of the 144). Of the thirteen companies listed on the Top 25 VC Deals 
lists that relocated to California, six had been the recipients of California-based VC investment 
(46%). In the complete sample, only 57 of 144 companies had received California-based 
investment (40%). In an interview with the authors, one individual heavily involved in Atlanta’s 
technology industry provided context and helped to explain this phenomenon:  
A lot of the best companies don’t even look for money in Atlanta. They purposefully look 
for lead investors outside Atlanta for the reason that they don’t believe that the Atlanta 
venture [capital] community has the network necessary to bring intangibles to the party.  
Now they typically will allow or elect to have a local VC in the syndicate of investment 
but very few are being led by local VCs.  
 
 After investigating investment ties, we tried to determine whether our analysis of individuals’ 
level of embeddedness is valid. In order to better understand how executives at Atlanta ICT 
companies became tied to other regions, we gathered data on the location in 2010 of executives 
of companies that had been considered promising in 2000. Of the 232 individuals for whom data 
could be found, 60 (28%) are no longer in Georgia. Their most common destinations were 
California (12.5%) and New York (9.4%). As job mobility in our sample was 66 percent lower 
than the U.S. computer industry average, such a high degree of migration of already successful 
executives out of the cluster is especially significant, suggesting that, for many, a job change also 
means leaving the Atlanta region (Fallick, Fleischman et al. 2006). This finding is strengthened 
by analyzing the location of board members, with the result that they often also relocated to more 
dominant clusters. Of the seventy-one board members of the “most promising companies” for 
whom locations could be ascertained, 32 percent had left Georgia. 
 
We concluded that the fragmentation was also affected by the period of a company’s growth 
cycle. Specifically, our analysis indicated that as companies reached their rapid expansion phase, 
after they have already maximized the benefits of their locale and cemented key relationships 
(such as those with customers, board members, and investors) with the dominant cluster, there 
was an acceleration of relocation of firms from the aspiring cluster to an already dominant one.  
 
Within three years of receiving their major VC investment, more than 40 percent of these highly 
promising companies left Atlanta, as shown in Figure 2. Of the fifty-one companies on this list 
that have left Georgia, thirteen are now in California, eight in New York/New Jersey, and seven 
in Florida. No more than three companies relocated to other regions. In addition, the median age of VC-invested companies that have left Georgia is six years, or in the middle of what is 
typically the rapid expansion phase at successful technology companies.  
 
The critical importance on these relocations of social connections, especially of out-of-state VCs, 
is widely understood in the industry, and it was repeatedly commented upon by our interviewees. 
A prominent leader of the industry who sits on several boards went as far as to comment:  
 
“Today I did a great service to Atlanta. I convinced a local high potential start-up to 
accept a local VC funding and decline one from Menlo Park. Had they taken the 
investment from Silicon Valley, by next year they would not have been in Atlanta, they 
would have moved stock, lock, and barrel to the Valley. These decisions on local versus 
out of state VC investments are crucial to the development of the company, do the 
founders become part of Atlanta, or do they pack and leave the region” (authors’ 
interviews). 
 
To determine whether our theory about the historical self-reinforcing  process that leads to this 
fragmentation has merit, we analyzed the career affiliation networks of the most promising and 
highly successful samples in about 2000, as well as the board member interlocks of Fortune 500 
and highly successful ICT companies. Figures 7 and 10 illustrate social network diagrams of the 
career affiliation networks of the most promising and highly successful companies for 2000 and 
2008, respectively. The network shows less connectivity among companies in 2008 than in 2000. 
The fragmentation in connectivity of Atlanta’s technology industry has been increasing over 
time.  
<<Figure 10 about here>> 
 
The same results appear in board interlock networks. As can be seen in Figures 5 and 11—board 
interlocks between and among highly successful ICT and Fortune 500 companies—social fragmentation does appear to have worsened. In Figure 11 (ca. 2000), one can see that a cluster 
primarily of Fortune 500 companies existed. Some of the highly successful ICT companies  are 
also connected to this cluster. However, in Figure 5 (ca. 2008), these interlocks have largely 
disappeared.  
<<Figure 11 about here>> 
 
As our analyses indicate, the reality is that the industry’s social fragmentation has persisted and 
probably even worsened across several domains. Hence, Atlanta’s ICT industry is locked in a 
self-reinforcing dynamic that prevents it from coalescing and emerging as a coherent industrial 
community—a true cluster.  
 
Conclusion 
Embeddedness has been the focus of intense research in the past three decades, and we now 
understand its critical importance in socioeconomic life. Much of the research treats 
embeddedness as local in its formation and effects. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in 
the study of industrial clusters. Nonetheless, there is growing awareness that, with the increased 
globalization of economic activities, cross-cluster ties and influence are extremely important, 
although research on their influence is still lacking. Such research is critical for understanding 
many of the most theoretically important questions of socioeconomics and for designing policies 
on pressing matters that take embeddedness into account.  
 
The emergence of new ICT clusters has been one of the most important questions in recent 
decades. This paper proposes a new way of thinking about the failure of clusters to emerge, arguing that we must understand the interlinked dynamics between cross-cluster embeddedness 
and local social fragmentation. By so doing, we return to the debate about cluster development 
two understudied factors. First is the need to inculcate a historical and dynamic understanding of 
ICT industrial development at the national level. Second is the fact that clusters do not develop 
in isolation. Hence, following in the footsteps of recent studies by Whittington et al., Powell, and 
Saxenian, among others, we argue that cross-cluster social relationships are crucial as local 
social relationships in the development trajectory of aspiring clusters (Klepper and Graddy 1990; 
Powell, White et al. 2005; Saxenian 2006; Kogut, Urso et al. 2007; Powell, Packalen et al. 2009; 
Whittington, Owen-Smith et al. 2009). With this cross-cluster embeddedness viewpoint in mind, 
we argue that the best explanation for the non-emergence of new ICT clusters is the influence 
exerted on aspiring clusters by the dominant clusters already established. Consequently, while 
locally focused analysis might tend to see these failures and successes as independent 
occurrences, our analysis comes from a national perspective, which sees these failures as 
integrally related to a national industrial system that consists of dominant and feeder clusters.    
 
To support our theory, we have presented evidence from Atlanta’s ICT industry. Atlanta is a 
region richly endowed with all the factors deemed necessary for industrial success, coupled with 
a long history of innovative policy implementation as well as early global leaders in the industry, 
yet it has nonetheless seen its ICT industry stagnate without the emergence of a coherent cluster. 
In conducting this analysis, we also show the merit of combining a few social network analysis 
techniques—namely, career affiliation and directory lists—when trying to explain the 
coevolution of social dynamics and structure. This multinetwork analysis approach, which aims 
to scrutinize the various ways in which embeddedness affects economic outcomes, has rarely been employed, and therefore this paper contributes to the well-established field of social 
network research. Thus, this paper should be regarded as a first step in multiple future research 
trajectories. 
 
Our findings suggest two main avenues for public policy. First, new policies should be adopted 
that encourage and cement physical embeddedness by facilitating information sharing, securing 
critical beta sites and anchor customers, collective learning, access to resources, and business 
community building. Some examples of this could include incentives for local venture capitalists 
to invest in local companies; collaboration between large or medium sized local companies and 
small local companies that is beneficial to both parties; and creation of opportunities for 
companies to find local suppliers, customers, and labor. 
 
Second, new policies should be adopted that slow or eliminate the need for cross-cluster social 
interactions. Venture capitalists that wish to invest in the region can be encouraged to open a 
local office prior to any investment. Incentives can be created to encourage companies and 
individuals that are footloose to stay in or move to the region. Perhaps a new set of institutions, 
anchored around a major organization in the community, will need to be created expressly for 
this purpose. Increasing local embeddedness ensures longevity in return on investment and 
enables transformation of these investments into successful local entrepreneurial ventures.  
 
Taking both research and policy implications into account, two of the most promising domains 
for future research are, first, a comparative study of clusters and the interlinked influences 
between their social networks and industrial agents such as entrepreneurs, firms, and financiers. Recent research, of which this paper is part, has revealed the critical influence of cross-cluster 
interaction on regional and local development. A fuller development of this literature will require 
the gathering, compiling, and analysis of data on cross and comparative clusters’ social 
networks. Our theories can be developed only so far in the absence of solid and rich empirical 
data. 
 
A second avenue for future research is further investigation of whether cross-cluster interactions 
are indeed the main driver of cluster development trajectories. If our assumptions are correct, we 
should see the influence of cross-cluster interaction on a panoply of ICT development, such as 
labor market movement, social legitimization and status-granting influences, and business model 
diffusion. Moreover, while in this paper we focused on the influence of such interactions on 
aspiring clusters, exploring the influence of such interactions on dominant clusters and their 
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 Figures 
Figure 1: Technology companies with 250 or more employees, 1998-2006 
 
Source: County Business Patterns (U.S. Census Bureau). 
 
 Figure 2: Percentage of promising companies no longer in Georgia 
 
Source: Atlanta Business Chronicle; Internet Archive (Atlanta Business Chronicle, 1998-2008). 
Data collected in October 2008. 
 Figure 3: Interlocks network in Atlanta’s ICT industry, 2008 
  
Figure 4: Interlocks network including investors and law firms of Atlanta’s ICT 
companies, 2008 
 
Legend: black circles: companies, grey squares: investors, gray circles: legal Figure 5: Interlocks network most successful (black circles) and Fortune 500 companies 


























 Figure 7: Career affiliation network most promising and highly successful, 2008 
 
 Figure 8: Career affiliation network of Atlanta health information technology (HIT) 
companies, 2008 
 
 Figure 9: Investor locations of most promising companies by rank 1999-2007 
 
Source: Atlanta Business Chronicles, annual book of lists, 1999-2007. 
 
   Figure 10: Career affiliation network most promising and highly successful, 
2000
 Figure 11: Interlocks network highly successful (black circles) and Fortune 500 companies 
(grey squares), 2000 
 
 
Note: Bell South is depicted as a grey circle because it appeared in both the Tech 50 and Fortune 500 in 2000. 
 
 